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1 Introduction
Local government’s newly acquired status as a fully-fledged sphere of
government with constitutionally protected powers is slowly gaining momentum.
Now that the dust is slowly settling around the demarcation and establishment
of local government institutions, the demarcation of local government powers vis-
à-vis other spheres of government is fast becoming a critical area of academic
research and intergovernmental dialogue. As they become aware of their
constitutional scope, municipalities will start asserting their institutional integrity
with powerful metropolitan municipalities taking the lead.
In an earlier article in this journal, the approach to local government powers
as set out in the Constitution was outlined.1 This article takes the matter further
and presents a case study on the demarcation of local government powers in
one specific area, namely the regulation of the liquor retail industry. 
In the Liquor Bill judgment of 2000 more clarity was provided about national
versus provincial powers regarding the liquor retail industry.2 Another important
issue is the division between provincial and local powers. Schedule 5A of the
Constitution lists ‘Liquor licences’ as a provincial competency. Schedule 5B of
the Constitution lists ‘Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public’ as a
local government competency. This apparent overlap in the constitutional regime
on provincial and local legislative powers over liquor retail matters raises two
demarcation issues. The first demarcation issue is: what is the difference between
‘Liquor licences’ (a provincial competency) and ‘Control of undertakings that sell
liquor to the public’ (a local government competency)? This question will be dealt
with in sections  2 and 3 of this article. The second demarcation issue is: to what
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extent can provinces still exert influence over municipal lawmaking on the
‘Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public’? This issue will be
discussed in section 4 of this article. Finally, section 5 addresses some practical
consequences of the arguments put forward here.
2 Definition of ‘liquor licences’
The judgment of the Constitutional Court in the Liquor Bill case is
instrumental in plumbing a definition of the provincial competency ‘Liquor
licences’. In line with the Bill before it, the Court divided the industrial chain
regarding liquor into (1) manufacturing, (2) wholesale distribution and (3)
retail sale.
The new Liquor Act3 follows the same approach and in section 1 it defines
retail sale as ‘the sale of liquor for the purpose of consumption’. A retail seller
is defined as ‘a person who is registered or licensed in terms of applicable
provincial legislation to sell liquor, or make liquor available for sale, for the
purpose of consumption’.
It is clear from the Liquor Bill judgment and from the division put forward in
the Liquor Act that the competency ‘Liquor licences’ is concerned with retail sale.
Cameron AJ, in writing for the Court in the above judgment, accepted the
definition of a liquor licence as ‘the permission that a competent authority
gives to someone to do something with regard to liquor that would otherwise
be unlawful’ and he described the activity as ‘the sale of liquor at specified
premises’. According to the Court, the constitutional term ‘Liquor licensing’
encompasses –
1 the grant or refusal of the permission concerned;
2 the power to impose conditions pertinent to that permission; and
3 the collection of revenue that might arise from or be attached to its grant.4
Where provinces are afforded exclusive competency over a particular
matter, it is suggested that this matter should be interpreted as one that is most
appropriately legislated in the provincial sphere because it requires provincial
uniformity. That backdrop is also helpful when trying to locate the borderline
with ‘Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public’. It is submitted that
the issues that require provincial uniformity in the liquor retail industry centre
around three themes, namely (1) a fair, equitable and flourishing liquor retail
market, (2) health and basic safety and (3) security and reducing socio-
economic costs of alcohol consumption.
A fair, equitable and flourishing liquor retail market includes matters such
as protecting free market principles (eg retailers should have no substantial
interests in wholesale distributing companies), promoting entry of new
participants, stimulating regional and provincial retail industry (eg wine
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industry), rules for the content of advertising, employment issues in the retail
industry, promoting business skills of retailers, et cetera.
The issue of health and basic safety and security includes what types of
liquor may be sold, suitability of premises, hygiene issues, suitability of the
applicant (to prevent unsuitable candidates going ‘shopping’ with different
municipalities), et cetera.
Reducing socio-economic costs of alcohol consumption has to do with
matters such as addressing alcohol abuse, preventing the sale of liquor to
minors, combating drunk driving, preventing the sale of liquor to drunk
persons, promoting general social responsibility in the retail industry, et cetera.
It is submitted that the competency ‘Liquor licences’ involves the grant or
refusal of the permission to sell liquor, the power to impose conditions
pertinent to that permission and the collection of revenue that might arise from
or be attached to its grant in so far as it is directed at achieving the objectives
that require provincial uniformity as mentioned above.
3 Definition of ‘control of undertakings that sell
liquor to the public’
A more complex issue is the delimitation of the above provincial competency and
the municipal competency ‘Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public’.
The mere fact that the Constitution includes the two competencies in two different
lists indicates that, despite the obvious overlap, there is a difference. 
3.1 Preliminary considerations 
It is submitted that the exercise of delimitation must be informed by the following
considerations. First, delimitation of competencies can never be absolute.5 Overlap
is inevitable and the resulting tension must be resolved within the framework of
co-operative government. Second, this does not mean that delimitation of
competencies is unnecessary. Co-operative government is based on respect for
institutional status6 and on the duty to refrain from assuming powers or functions,
except those conferred in terms of the Constitution.7 A certain degree of clarity on
functions and powers is necessary before negotiations to resolve the above tension
can be useful. Third, the inquiry whether particular legislation lies outside the
competency of a particular sphere depends not only on its form but also on the
purpose and effect (‘pith and substance’).8 It is suggested that this is particularly
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relevant in relation to local government’s constitutional mandate, commonly
termed as ‘developmental local government’.9 If the ‘purpose and effect’ of
provincial legislation on a Schedule 5A matter that has a ‘local government
counterpart’ (in Schedule 4B or Schedule 5B) overlaps with this mandate of
developmental local government, it goes beyond what is constitutionally
permitted. Assisted by these general considerations, the borderline between the
two competencies can be identified. 
3.2 Defining local government’s role
The definition of local government’s role, as enunciated in the constitutional
competency ‘Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public’ comprises two
elements: (1) the undertakings that sell liquor to the public and (2) the control of
such undertakings.10 The first element reveals an overlap with the above definition
of retail sale of liquor (see section 2 above). These undertakings include bars,
taverns, bottle stores, restaurants, grocery stores, micro-breweries and wine
estates. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘control’ refers to ‘dominate,
command, hold in check, verify, regulate (prices etc)’.11 What then, is it that the
Constitution wants local government to ‘control’, if it is not the possession of a
liquor licence? In view of the fact that the Constitution refers to ‘the undertakings’
that sell liquor, it is suggested that the control measures must relate to the act of
selling liquor to the public.12 
As stated above, the constitutional objects of local government and the
notion of developmental local government are relevant to this inquiry.
Municipalities must promote social and economic development and they must
promote a safe and healthy environment.13 In other words, the development of
communities and the protection of the environment in which they live, are
primary concerns for local government. 
It is submitted that the Schedule 5B competency sees to the ‘public order’
effects of liquor outlets. Local government’s perspective in regulating the liquor
industry is: the impact that the act of selling liquor has on the community around
a liquor outlet. The composition of the two Schedules, particularly their local
government components, bears testimony to this constitutional intention.
Competencies such as ‘Municipal planning’, ‘Amusement facilities’, ‘Control of
public nuisances’, ‘Noise pollution’, ‘Public places’ and ‘Traffic and parking’ are
all aimed at regulating ‘public order effects’ of a myriad of activities, including
the sale of liquor.14 
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Support for this can also be found in Bulk Deals Six v Chairman of the
Liquor Board of the Western Cape.15 The case was decided under the old
Liquor Act16 but is instructive. The provincial Liquor Board had refused a
liquor licence on the basis of its conviction that granting it would not be in the
‘public interest’,17 because ‘the opening of restaurants that trade extensively
during the evenings will have an impact on the surrounding residents’.18 The
Board contended that the Act required it to consider the impact of granting a
licence on the residents of the surrounding area.
The Court held that the Board erred in elevating the interests of people
living close to the liquor outlet to the ‘public interest’.19 The Board had
overemphasised the interests of the residents. The Court made it clear that
issues such as traffic noise are dealt with (through, for example, zoning) at
local level and that the Board should have considered issues such as free
market principles and the nature of the establishment.20 
This judgment shows that, even under the old Liquor Act of 1989, there is a
distinction between granting liquor licences and controlling their effect on public
order. It is submitted that there is no reason why this approach should not be
followed when interpreting Schedule 5 of the Constitution. If ‘Liquor licences’
were to include controlling the ‘public order effects’ of undertakings that sell
liquor, there would be no point for the Constitution in listing the latter as a
separate competency where local government is the primary policy formulator.
It is suggested that local government may control undertakings that sell
liquor to the public regardless of whether or not they have a liquor licence. It
goes without saying that selling liquor without a licence is prohibited21 and
local government could be tasked by the province to enforce this (eg through
delegation or assignment). However, the Schedule 5, Part B competency does
not confer on local government the authority to enforce provincial liquor
licence regulations. The corollary of this argument is the following: the mere
fact that a liquor outlet is unlicensed does not place it outside the competency
of the municipality to control its activities.
(2004) 19 SAPR/PL370
22Sch 5B of the Constitution (the heading). 
23Barring national intervention in terms of s 44(2) of the Constitution. 
3.3 What are ‘public order effects’?
What are the ‘public order effects’ that the Constitution wants local
government to control? It is submitted that they involve first, the question
where liquor should be sold to the public and secondly, when liquor should be
sold to the public.
Municipalities decide where liquor may be sold mainly though the zoning of
properties for such a purpose. Local government, as the institutional locus of com-
munity interests, can articulate the interests of residents and is best placed to have
regard to the issues that the Court in Bulk Deals Six correctly excluded from the
realm of the province’s decision. These are issues such as traffic noise, other noise
pollution, development of the area, social considerations pertaining to the com-
munity concerned, children’s safety, vicinity of places of worship, old age homes
and child care facilities, and in particular communities’ views on these matters.
Municipalities also decide when liquor may be sold. In other words,
municipalities decide the opening hours of liquor outlets and decide on which
days liquor may be sold. In this regard, it is contended that the current practice
where provincial Liquor Boards prescribe in a liquor licence when the licensee
can sell liquor lies outside the provincial competency ‘Liquor licences’. The
extent to which this practice could be permitted in terms of the provincial
competency to regulate ‘Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public’
in terms of section 155 of the Constitution, is part of the second demarcation
issue and will therefore be discussed below.
4 Provincial competency to regulate municipal
lawmaking 
4.1 Preliminary considerations
Local government’s competency to legislate on the control of liquor outlets is
not exclusive to local government. The provincial government may also
legislate on these matters, albeit only ‘to the extent set out for provinces in
sections 155(6)(a) and 155(7)’.22 
This means that the provincial government has two areas of competency
with regard to the liquor industry. The first area is the full23 competency on
liquor licences (as defined above). The second is the limited competency to
legislate on the control of liquor outlets by local government. The two should
be clearly distinguished. There is a danger that provincial legislation on matters
pertaining to the control of liquor outlets may be too easily sanctioned on the
basis of its competency regarding ‘Liquor licences’. Because its competency
regarding ‘Liquor licences’ is an unconstrained competency, this approach
would result in a breach of local government’s institutional integrity.
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4.2 Sources of provincial power in local government matters
As stated above, there are two provisions in the Constitution that provide a
basis for provincial lawmaking on local government matters. Section 155(6)(a)
confers the power on provincial governments to –
... by legislative or other measures (...) provide for the monitoring and support
of local government in the province.
Section 155(7) states that provincial governments –
... have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective performance
by municipalities of their functions in respect of matters listed in Schedules 4 and
5, by regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority referred
to in section 156(1).
The Constitution instructs local government to strive towards promoting
development in its area of jurisdiction. It is suggested that this instruction
necessitates an interpretation of local government powers that recognises the need
for sufficient municipal discretion in regulating Schedule 5B matters such as
control on liquor outlets. If local government is to live up to the constitutional
promise of ‘developmental local government’ it must be allowed to govern at its
own initiative, as stipulated by section 151(3) of the Constitution, without undue
interference from central and/or provincial governments. At the same time, the
imperative of coherent governance requires provincial oversight and regulation.
4.2.1 Provincial power to monitor
 It is suggested that the provincial power to monitor, laid down in section
155(6)(a) may entail legislative measures aimed at establishing a monitoring
framework. 
The Constitutional Court has held that the word ‘monitor’ in section 155(6)
does not represent a substantial power in itself, certainly not a power to control
[local government] affairs, but has reference to other, broader powers of
supervision and control.24 
According to the Court, the power to monitor should not be interpreted as –
... bestowing additional or residual powers of provincial intrusion on the domain
of local government, beyond perhaps the power to measure or test at intervals
its compliance with national and provincial legislative directives or with the
Constitution itself. What the [Constitution] seeks hereby to realise is a structure
for [local government] that, on the one hand, reveals a concern for the autonomy
and integrity of [local government] and prescribes a hands-off relationship
between [local government] and other levels of government and, on the other,
acknowledges the requirement that higher levels of government monitor [local
government] functioning and intervene where such functioning is deficient or
defective in a manner that compromises this autonomy.25 
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In sum, the power to monitor does not provide a provincial government with
powers regarding the control of liquor outlets that are additional to the powers
of local government. It may be used only as a means to obtain information
from local government on the exercise of its powers to control liquor outlets
and as a means to prescribe ways and procedures to provide information. This
information may then be used in the context of provincial support and
provincial supervision of local government.26 
4.2.2 Provincial power to support
According to the Court, the powers to support local government 
...can be employed by provincial governments to strengthen existing [local
government] structures, powers and functions and to prevent a decline or
degeneration of such structures, powers and functions.27 
The Court terms the power to support in conjunction with other powers
‘substantial’ and states that ‘they facilitate a measure of provincial government
control over the manner in which municipalities administer’ Schedule 5, Part
B matters.28 
Despite the fact that the power to support is substantial, it is clear that it
comes into play only in the event of (threatening) decline or degeneration of
local government performance. In the absence of a need to address or prevent
such degeneration or decline, the power to support cannot be construed as
providing the provincial government with any say in the content of municipal
law on the control of liquor outlets. 
4.2.3 Provincial power to regulate
The powers to regulate conferred on the provincial government by section
155(7) are significant, albeit also limited. The Constitutional Court labels
section 155(7) a ‘substantial constraint’.29 The power is circumscribed by the
context of seeing to the ‘effective performance by municipalities of their
functions’ and by the term ‘regulating’. The term ‘seeing to’ connotes a certain
distance. The term ‘regulating’ in the context of section 155(7) was held by the
Constitutional Court to connote ‘a broad managing or controlling rather than
direct authorisation function’.30 
It is suggested that the provincial power to regulate Schedule 5B matters
does provide the province with a say in the content of municipal law on the
control of liquor outlets. However, this provincial say is limited to setting a
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framework. It is not open to provincial governments to regulate the detail of
municipal law on the control of liquor outlets. The framework must be
understood as setting the outer boundaries, providing minimum standards
while leaving intact a substantial degree of municipal discretion to make policy
decisions on the issue for the locality. 
In sum, sections 155(6)(a) and 155(7) confer on the provincial government
the power to provide a framework within which local government is to exercise
its powers to control liquor outlets. These powers do not extend to the detail
of municipal law on control of liquor outlets. They permit the provincial
government to set standards and establish minimum requirements and provide
the provincial government with the power to legislate monitoring procedures.
5 Some practical examples
What does the regime that was discussed above mean for the current
development of policy and practice in the area of liquor retail? The final
section of this article provides practical examples of the application of this
scheme for dividing powers and functions on liquor retail matters between
provincial and local government. Particular reference will be made to recent
policy developments in the Western Cape, which provide a useful illustration
of some of the issues that elicit debate.
5.1 Opening hours
 Earlier, the suggestion was made that the constitutional division of powers
implies that a provincial determination of the opening hours of a particular
liquor outlet is not in keeping with the Constitution. It is a local government
function to control the times when a particular undertaking sells liquor.
However, section 155(6)(a) and 155(7) of the Constitution allows provincial
government to determine the framework within which local government
exercises this power. This could include categories, linked to maximum hours
of trade, other general principles for opening hours, monitoring procedures,
and so on. A case could be made out for the provincial government setting a
provincial standard for days on which liquor outlets are open (eg pertaining to
Sundays and public holidays). Provincial government could prescribe
monitoring procedures, such as municipal reports on the number of inspections
conducted, fines handed out, criteria used for enforcement, and so on.
5.2 Interface between provincial and municipal legislation
If the Constitution affords the two spheres of government distinct areas of
legislation, how do the two regulatory schemes interact in a particular
instance? Is the provincial act of issuing a licence subject to the provisions of
by-laws adopted in terms of Schedule 4B or Schedule 5B? For example, to
what extent is the issuing of a liquor licence subject to municipal town
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planning legislation or building regulations? Town planning and building
regulations are Schedule 4B competencies. Municipalities administer their own
town planning schemes and building regulations within the parameters set by
the provincial government. In order to answer this question adequately, a
distinction must be made between two possible scenarios.
The first scenario would be where the province issues a licence on the basis
of considerations and subject to conditions that fall within the realm of a
Schedule 4B function or a Schedule 5B function. For example, a liquor licence
is issued to a particular entrepreneur and this licence stipulates that liquor may
be sold at a particular outlet from 10 am until 11 pm. This provincial decision
falls outside of the competency ‘Liquor licences’ (as defined in section 2
above). It also falls outside of the provincial competency in terms of section
155(6)(a) or 155(7) (as defined in section 3 above). These two provisions
permit the province to regulate ‘the exercise by municipalities of their
executive authority’ over Schedule 5B matters.31 Section 155(6)(a) and 155(7)
does not permit the province to replace the municipal exercise of these
functions with its own decision. This would militate against the intention of the
Constitution to reserve the regulation of ‘public order’ effects of liquor sales
for municipalities. What would be the purpose of affording local government
a competency if the issue can be completely determined by the province? The
province acts in contravention of the Constitutional division of powers between
provincial and local government. The act of issuing a licence will be invalid
because it is based on legislation that is unconstitutional.
The second scenario would be where the province issues a licence on the
basis of considerations and subject to conditions that fall within the realm of
‘Liquor licences’ (as defined in section 2 above) but the licence holder fails to
comply with by-laws adopted in terms of Schedule 4B or Schedule 5B. For
example, a licence has been issued but the premises from which the licence
will be operated does not comply with provisions in a municipal by-law
pertaining to issues such as land use planning, permit schemes, trading hours
of liquor outlets, permits to exceed noise levels, and so on. Another example:
a provincial liquor licence is issued but the municipal by-law stipulates that
liquor sales in that area after 6 pm require a municipal permit. This scenario
should be treated differently. The onus is on the entrepreneur to ensure that the
necessary permits are obtained and municipal laws adhered to. The act of
issuing a provincial licence itself is not dependent on whether or not the
applicant also complies with other regulations. This is the applicant’s
responsibility. After the liquor licence has been issued, the provincial
government can no longer enforce the general prohibition of selling liquor
without a licence because the applicant does have one. However, the municipal
government can still enforce its own by-laws and regulations. In other words,
the licence is indeed subject to the provisions of the municipal by-law to the
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extent that the entrepreneur cannot commence with the activities before these
municipal laws have been complied with.
The need for coherent administration requires that provincial government
and local government attempt to integrate their respective application
procedures as far as possible. However, this cooperation should be premised
on cognisance of, and respect for, the distinct areas of governance that the
Constitution has allocated to the two spheres of government.
5.3 Examples of provincial policy
It seems that provincial departments are having difficulties appreciating the
new constitutional dispensation and its consequences for provincial and local
government powers. An analysis of the recently promulgated Proposed Liquor
Policy for the Western Cape32 reveals a view of local government powers
which, according to the author, is at odds with the Constitution.
First, the policy seems to follow the correct course when it says that ‘liquor
trading days and hours in an area of jurisdiction of a municipality will not be
imposed by the provincial liquor legislation’.33 However, it continues by
stating that provincial legislation will authorise appointed municipalities to set
liquor trading days and hours by by-law.34 It is suggested that it should be
apparent from the Constitutional regime as outlined above that the Constitution
has already authorised all municipalities to set liquor trading days and hours.
The provincial government may regulate the exercise of this function within
the limits of section 155(6)(a) and 155(7). The provincial government exceeds
these constitutional constraints as soon as it prevents municipalities from
exercising their constitutional competency by not ‘appointing’ them.
Second, municipal by-laws that set the liquor trading days and hours are
‘subject to the approval process by the Minister responsible for economic
development’.35 From the above scheme it follows that it is not open for the
provincial government to require provincial approval of municipal by-laws.
These by-laws are enacted within a competency that the Constitution has
reserved for local government, namely ‘Control of undertakings that sell liquor
to the public’. It is submitted that section 155(6)(a) and 155(7) does not permit
this kind of ‘regulation’ of a local government competency either. Other
proposals that the Provincial Liquor Policy makes, such as the Minister setting
closed days and maximum hours of trade regulation, are permissible.36
However, approval entails a (possible) review of the by-law on all aspects.
According to the Constitutional Court, municipal councils are legislative
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assemblies in their own right37 and their legislative products are in no way less
protected against provincial (dis)approval than provincial acts are against
national (dis)approval.
Third, the Provincial Liquor Policy states that the provincial Liquor Board
will have the right to impose restricted trading hours despite of the municipal
by-law ‘should the location or circumstances warrant this’.38 If this were to
become law, it would go outside the parameters of the Constitution. There
would be no point in a constitutional competency to legislate on a particular
topic, if that legislation can be ignored in a provincial procedure. 
Fourth, according to the Provincial Liquor Policy, the Western Cape
government intends to require from municipalities that they submit by-laws
relating to municipal liquor trading functions for approval to the Minister for
Economic Development.39 However, any requirement to submit by-laws to
provincial organs for reasons other than the sharing of information or
publication in the Provincial Gazette is unconstitutional.
Another proposal that does not bode well for local government is one that
makes provision for the approval of a licence when the land use requirements are
not met. The policy asserts that, under certain conditions, the outlet ‘will be
deemed to meet the land use planning requirements set by the municipality for the
premises’.40 It is submitted that this proposal goes beyond what is constitutionally
permitted. Municipal planning is a local government competency. To allow pro-
vincial government to unilaterally make the decision as to whether or not
municipal planning requirements are (‘deemed to be’) met, is not in keeping with
the constitutional division of powers and functions. The precedent in other provin-
cial legislation, referred to by the Provincial Liquor Policy, does little to mend this
constitutional disjuncture. On the contrary, the multitude of precedents in national
and provincial statutes that ignore local government’s place in the Constitution is
precisely the problem. A ‘deeming provision’ such as the one proposed in the
Western Cape Liquor Policy does not prevent the relevant municipality from
continuing to enforce its own land use planning rules vis- à-vis the retailer, despite
any certificate or permit to the contrary, issued by the Liquor Board.
6 Conclusion
In this article it was argued that the Constitution instructs provincial and local
government to arrive at an approach where provincial government is
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responsible, through liquor licensing, for regulating the liquor retail market in
general, securing health and basic safety as well as reducing socio-economic
costs of alcohol use – while local government’s developmental mandate
requires municipalities to regulate the ‘public order’ effects of liquor sales
(subject to provincial standards). The latter boils down to determining when
and where liquor may be sold. The division of responsibilities between
provincial and national government cannot be absolute, and problems arising
from the inevitable overlap need to be solved within the framework of co-
operative government. Examples taken from the Western Cape Provincial
Liquor Policy reveal that the changes in the constitutional design of local
government are not being appreciated fully by policy makers in this area. In
order for the policy to pass constitutional muster, it needs revision in the areas
where it encroaches on local government’s institutional integrity.
